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ELECTIONS 
Elections and Primaries Generally: Amend Chapter 2 of Title 21 of 
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Primaries and 
Elections Generally, so as to Provide for Definitions; Provide for 
Uniform Election Equipment in this State; Provide for Ballot 
Marking Devices and Standards and Procedures for Such Devices; 
Provide for the Manner of Qualifying Presidential Elector 
Candidates for Independent Candidates for the Offices of President 
and Vice President of the United States; Provide for the Time for 
Filing Evidence of Nomination by Political Body Candidates; 
Clarify the Age for Voting; Provide for Audits of Election Results 
and Procedures Therefor; Revise and Clarify Procedures for Voter 
Registration and List Maintenance Activities; Authorize the 
Secretary of State to Become a Member of a Nongovernmental 
Entity for Purposes of Maintaining Electors Lists under Certain 
Conditions; Provide for Minimum Requirements and Form of 
Information on Electronic Ballot Markers; Provide for 
Confidentiality of Certain Records and Documents; Extend the 
Time Period Allowing for Public Comment on Precinct 
Realignments; Place Time Limits on Relocation of Polling Places; 
Provide for Additional Sites for a Registrar’s Office or Place of 
Registration for Absentee Ballots; Provide for the Delivery of 
Absentee Ballots to Certain Persons in Custody; Provide for the 
Manner of Processing Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee 
Ballots; Provide a Cure for an Elector Whose Absentee Ballot Was 
Rejected; Provide for the Form of Absentee Ballot Oath Envelopes; 
Provide for the Time for Advance Voting and Manner and Location 
of Advance Voting; Provide for Assistance in Voting; Provide for 
Ease of Reading Ballots; to Provide that a Voter Identification 
Card Is Valid Until an Elector Moves Out of the County in Which 
It Was Issued or Is No Longer Eligible to Vote; Provide for 
Notification Procedures for Status of Provisional Ballots; Provide 
for the Time for Certifying Elections; Provide for Precertification 
Audits; Provide for Entitlement to and Methods for Recounts; 
Provide for Conforming Changes; Provide for Related Matters; 
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Provide for an Effective Date; Repeal Conflicting Laws; and for 
Other Purposes 
CODE SECTIONS: O.C.G.A §§ 21-2-2 (amended), -2.1 
(new), -4.1 (amended), -7.1 (new), -18 
(amended), -19.1 (new), -32.1 (new), 
50 (amended), -132.1 (new), -172 
(amended), -216 (amended), -220.1 
(amended), -225 (amended), -230 
(amended), -231 (amended), -232 
(amended), -234 (amended), -235 
(amended), -262 (amended), -265 
(amended), -267 (amended), -286 
(amended), -293 (amended), -300 
(amended), -365 (amended), -367 
(amended), -369 (amended), -372 
(amended), -374 (amended), -375 
(amended), -377 (amended), -379.21–
.26 (new), -381 (amended), -382 
(amended), -383 (amended), -384 
(amended), -385 (amended), -386 
(amended), -388 (amended), -409 
(amended), -413 (amended), -417.1 
(amended), -418 (amended), -419 
(amended), -482 (amended), -493 
(amended), -495 (amended), -498 
(amended), -499 (amended), -566 
(amended),  -579 (amended), -580 
(amended), -582 (amended), -582.1 
(amended), -587 (amended) 
BILL NUMBER: HB 316 
ACT NUMBER: 24 
GEORGIA LAWS: 2019 Ga. Laws 7 
SUMMARY:  The Act authorizes and requires a new 
voting system be used in all 
elections, provides for auditing 
procedures, provides for updates to the 
voter list maintenance laws, and 
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specifies additional revisions to 
election processes. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: April 2, 2019 
History 
In 2016, Russia interfered with the 2016 United States (U.S.) 
presidential election “in sweeping and systematic fashion,”1 sparking 
emotions ranging from mild concern to outrage from American 
voters.2 Subsequent investigations found that Georgia, although not 
among the twenty-one targeted states, had several county election 
websites visited by Russian military spies seeking to identify 
vulnerabilities in Georgia’s central voting system just weeks before 
the 2016 election.3 But identifying vulnerabilities in Georgia’s 
central elections server, which has been maintained at Kennesaw 
State University (KSU) in the Center for Election Services (CES) 
since 2002, did not require foreign hackers or rogue spies seeking to 
infiltrate and tamper with the election outcome.4 
In August 2016, months before Russia tried to subvert Georgia’s 
election websites, professional cybersecurity expert Logan Lamb 
discovered the state’s database containing 6.7 million voters and 
instructions and passwords for election supervisors to operate the 
direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines and access the 
central server.5 Lamb also uncovered software files for electronic poll 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 1 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO 
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1 (2019), https://static.c-
span.org/files/Searchable+Mueller+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D93-6RFV]. 
 2. Miles Parks, NPR/Marist Poll: 1 in 3 Americans Thinks a Foreign Country Will Change 
Midterm Votes, NPR (Sept. 17, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/17/647420970/npr-
marist-poll-1-in-3-americans-think-foreign-country-will-change-midterm-votes [https://perma.cc/3LSV-
ZRCT]; Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So 
Far, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-
interference-election-trump-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/D6LV-RS5Q]. 
 3. Indictment at ¶ 7, United States v. Netyksho, No. 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ, (D.D.C. July 13, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download [https://perma.cc/SCK5-L52N]; Ellen Nakashima, In 
Georgia, a Legal Battle Over Electronic vs. Paper Voting, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2018, 10:48 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-georgia-a-legal-battle-over-electronic-vs-
paper-voting/2018/09/16/d655c070-b76f-11e8-94eb-
3bd52dfe917b_story.html?utm_term=.fb36f51dc484 [https://perma.cc/CX4Q-QDUY]. 
 4. Curling v. Raffensperger, No. 1:17-cv-2989-AT, 2019 WL 3822123, at *21 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 
2019). 
 5. Kim Zetter, Was Georgia’s Election System Hacked in 2016?, POLITICO (July 18, 2018), 
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books and executable programs that could infect the central system 
with vote-changing malware, all of which were accessible on the 
CES’s public website.6 It was later determined that the server had 
been unsecured and exposed to the cyber world since 2014.7 
Although Lamb immediately reported his unnerving discovery to the 
Director of CES, one of Lamb’s colleagues, Christopher Grayson, 
was able to locate and access the same unsecured server again in 
March 2017, at which time Grayson notified a KSU faculty member 
and the University Information Technology System (UITS), which 
was able to establish a protective firewall to isolate the server that 
same day.8 
Although DRE voting machines have been almost entirely 
abandoned in the U.S. because of vulnerabilities like the ones Lamb 
exposed in August 2016,9 Georgia had once been on the cutting-edge 
of voting technology when it became the first state to adopt a DRE 
system in 2002.10 Prompted by Florida’s mishandling of votes in the 
2000 presidential election,11 Senator Jack Hill (R-4th) sponsored 
legislation in February 2001 that among other things created the 21st 
Century Voting Commission to evaluate voting equipment 
alternatives and make quick recommendations to the General 
Assembly.12 In 2002, after the Commission issued a final report later 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/18/mueller-indictments-georgia-voting-
infrastructure-219018 [https://perma.cc/QBG3-V74B]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. It may be impossible to ever know if anyone other than Lamb accessed Georgia’s central 
server system and databases, as four days after a lawsuit was filed against CES officials, the server and 
all backups were erased in what then-Secretary of State Brian Kemp (R) called “standard operating 
procedure.” Id.; see also Frank Bajak, Georgia Election Server Wiped After Suit Filed, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/877ee1015f1c43f1965f63538b035d3f 
[https://perma.cc/BM52-PZCG]. 
 8. Complaint at 1–10, 81, Curling v. Kemp I, No. 2017-CV-292233 (Fulton Co. Super. Ct. July 3, 
2017). 
 9. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., SECURING THE VOTE: PROTECTING AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 58 (2018), https://doi.org/10.17226/25120 [https://perma.cc/U9UX-WQAN]. 
 10. SECURE, ACCESSIBLE & FAIR ELECTIONS (SAFE) COMMISSION REPORT 14 (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://sos.ga.gov/admin/uploads/SAFE_Commission_Report_FINAL_(1-10-18).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LPR3-WJ8T] [hereinafter SAFE REPORT]; Nakashima, supra note 3. 
 11. SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4; SRC Study Contributes to Georgia Election Reform, 23 J. 
SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL 13, 13–14 
(2001), http://southernchanges.digitalscholarship.emory.edu/sc23-1_1204/sc23-1_006/ 
[https://perma.cc/7TH9-9GC3] [hereinafter SRC Study]. 
 12. SRC Study, supra note 11; Georgia General Assembly, SB 213, Bill Tracking, 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/20012002/SB/213. At the time the 21st Century 
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that year recommending DRE voting machines for in-person voting 
and an optical scan system for absentee voting by mail,13 Georgia 
became the first state in the country to use DRE voting machines.14 
Over seventeen years later, however, Georgia was one of the last five 
states to still use the antiquated and highly vulnerable DRE system.15 
The discoveries by Lamb and Christopher Grayson in 2016 and 
2017—bolstered by concerns about Russia’s interference in the 2016 
presidential election and an alarming increase in reports of the 
insecurities of DRE voting machines that generate no auditable paper 
trail—brought Georgia’s continued use of the DRE system to the 
forefront of both legislative and judicial attention.16 
In July 2017, several voters and an election integrity advocacy 
organization filed a lawsuit against then-Secretary of State Brian 
Kemp (R) and other elections officials in state court to enjoin any 
future use of DRE voting machines in Georgia.17 Additional lawsuits 
against Kemp and various elections officials ensued, challenging a 
range of state elections practices including both the use of DRE 
voting machines as well as the “exact match” rule.18 
                                                                                                                 
Voting Commission began meeting, Georgia experienced a pervasive lack of uniformity, relying on four 
different ballot systems across its 159 counties: lever machines, paper and scanning machines, 
punch-out ballots, and pen and paper. SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4. See generally Frances 
Conway Pratt, Elections and Primaries Generally, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 96 (2001). 
 13. REPORT OF THE 21ST CENTURY VOTING COMMISSION 38 (2001), 
https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/VotingSystems/files/2015/21stCenturyReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2EGR-6W3W]. 
 14. Statement from Kathy Rogers, Dir. of Election Admin., Ga. Office of Sec’y of State, to U.S. 
Election Assistance Commission (May 5, 2004). After DRE machines were implemented, the number of 
undervotes dropped from 3.5% in 2000 to 0.86% in 2002. Brit J. Williams & Merle S. King, 
Implementing Voting Systems: The Georgia Method, 47 COMMS. ACM 39, 39–42 (2004). The 2019 
SAFE Report touted the successful implementation of this technology as one of the primary reasons the 
Commission wanted to keep an electronic ballot-marking device. SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 9. 
Deputy Division Director of the National Science Foundation Jeremy Epstein, in his personal capacity, 
offered praise to the DRE system even in 2017 before the Georgia House Committee on Science and 
Technology for being outstandingly accurate, albeit inexcusably vulnerable to hacking and malware, 
thus necessitating its immediate abandonment. Video Recording of House Committee on Science and 
Technology Meeting at 23 min., 27 sec. (Sept. 22, 2017) (remarks by Jeremy Epstein, Deputy Division 
Director, National Science Foundation), https://youtu.be/OrnZEpyJzt4 [hereinafter House Science and 
Technology Committee Video]. 
 15. Curling v. Kemp, 334 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2018); Nakashima, supra note 3. 
 16. See generally Election Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on H. Admin., 116th Cong. 
(2019) (statement of Lawrence D. Norden, Deputy Dir., Democracy Program, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at 
NYU Sch. of Law); NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 9, at 78. 
 17. Complaint at 6-8, Curling v. Kemp I, No. 2017-CV-292233 (Fulton Co. Super. Ct. July 3, 2017). 
 18. Curling v. Raffensperger, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/amicus/voting/curling/default.html [https://perma.cc/6DY6-9E3G] (last visited Sept. 18, 
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Shortly after Curling I was filed, the Georgia House of 
Representatives Committee on Science and Technology met to 
discuss suggestions for new voting machines.19 Two bills, House Bill 
(HB) 680 and Senate Bill (SB) 403, were introduced in the following 
2018 legislative session seeking to eliminate Georgia’s use of DRE 
voting machines before specified election years; however, despite a 
general consensus that DRE voting machines were outdated and 
vulnerable to hacking,20 the state legislature failed to agree on 
legislation updating the state’s election system prior to the closely 
contested 2018 gubernatorial election.21 This failure prompted the 
Curling plaintiffs to seek a preliminary injunction in August 2018 
that would have required the state to switch to paper ballots at the 
eleventh hour.22 Although a federal judge denied the preliminary 
injunction, she found that the state’s continued reliance on the DRE 
system “likely results in ‘a debasement or dilution of the weight of 
                                                                                                                 
2019) (discussing various ongoing lawsuits such as Common Cause of Georgia v. Kemp, Martin v. 
Kemp, and Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden); see also Mark Niesse, Changes Coming to 
Georgia Purges, Vote Counts and Voting Machines, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/measure-would-change-georgia-purges-vote-
counts-and-voting-machines/lk1muv5jrC5SXI1wt29dzN/ [https://perma.cc/RF6W-NS7F] [hereinafter 
Changes Coming to Georgia]. The “exact match” rule previously disqualified a voter’s registration 
application if his or her first name, last name, birth date, driver’s license number, or social security 
number did not match the record on file with the Georgia Department of Driver Services or the federal 
Social Security Administration. Id. 
 19. House Science and Technology Committee Video, supra note 14, at 17 min., 21 sec. (remarks by 
Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)); SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3; Kristina Torres, Lawmakers Begin Talks 
About How to Replace Georgia’s Aging Vote System, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/lawmakers-begin-talks-about-how-replace-
georgia-aging-vote-system/A1e4ryglB9XgSZv1Dbb2GJ/ [https://perma.cc/UF9Y-LGME]. 
 20. House Science and Technology Committee Video, supra note 14, at 34 min., 42 sec. (remarks by 
Jeremy Epstein, Deputy Division Director, National Science Foundation). 
 21. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 680, May 10, 2018; State of Georgia Final 
Composite Status Sheet, SB 403, May 10, 2018. HB 680, a bipartisan bill that died in the House, would 
have prohibited use of DREs after January 1, 2019. Mark Niesse, Lawmakers Propose Switching 
Georgia from Digital to Paper Ballots, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/lawmakers-propose-switching-georgia-from-
digital-paper-ballots/DnMzFdOpB2fA52cZt8D4xO/# [https://perma.cc/JS9K-C7XT]. Senate Bill 403 
was a Republican bill that both chambers passed and would have allowed DREs to be used until January 
1, 2024; however, the chambers could not agree on a single version. Mark Niesse, Bill to Replace 
Georgia’s Electronic Voting Machines Falls Short, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/bill-replace-georgia-electronic-voting-
machines-falls-short/E3Y3rDmP3WhtbYRvKnaGGK/ [https://perma.cc/L4DY-6BKM]. 
    22.  Curling v. Kemp, 334 F.Supp.3d 1303, 1322 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2018) (quoting Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000)). As this matter remains ongoing at the time of this writing, this publication is 
not likely to reflect its current status. 
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[Plaintiffs’] vote[s],’”23 and warned the State defendants that “further 
delay is not tolerable in their tackling the challenges before the 
State’s election balloting system.”24 
Simultaneously, the Secure, Accessible & Fair Elections (SAFE) 
Commission, commenced in April 2018 by Kemp, was meeting to 
evaluate options available to replace DRE voting machines and set 
guidelines for the General Assembly to adopt a new system in the 
2019 legislative session, noting time constraints imposed by the 
pending Curling lawsuit.25 Of the SAFE Commission’s eight 
recommendations, the one point on which the Commission was not 
unanimous was also its most significant—that the state should adopt 
ballot-marking devices (BMDs) with verifiable paper ballots.26 The 
lone cybersecurity expert on the Commission, Dr. Wenke Lee, 
strongly dissented on that point, maintaining that not only are 
hand-marked ballots much more secure than ones marked with 
BMDs, but also that no studies support that voters actually verify 
their ballots before submitting them, which is of paramount 
importance in any device-generated ballot.27 
Over criticism from various cybersecurity experts and election 
systems professionals, SAFE Commission Co-Chair and State 
Representative Barry Fleming (R-121st) introduced HB 316.28 In 
accordance with the Commission’s recommendations, the bill sought 
to authorize and require the State to adopt a new voting system as 
soon as possible that would be conducted on an electronic 
ballot-marking device that generates a printed, human readable paper 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. at 1326. 
 24. Id. at 1327. 
 25. See generally SAFE REPORT, supra note 10. The final SAFE Commission report noted that it was 
“aware of the court order in Curling v. Kemp [that] strongly suggest[ed] that if Georgia does not update 
its voting system soon, a new system will be ordered.” Id. at 8. The Commission further stated that it 
was unanimous in its belief that “Georgia voters would be better served by a process that goes through 
their elected representatives in the General Assembly rather than be subjected to a system that is simply 
ordered by a federal judge.” Id. 
 26. SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 13. 
 27. Id. at 15–16. 
    28.  Jim Galloway, In HB 316, House GOP Leaders Concede that Stacey Abrams Had a Point, 
Atlanta J.-Const. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/316-house-gop-leaders-concede-
that-stacey-abrams-had-point/dpWD8iSJ7xSoJBMbLFYi1L/# [https://perma.cc/B8GX-W4K2]. 
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ballot for scanning.29 HB 316 also sought to address issues of voter 
eligibility and removal from the state registry due to inactivity.30 
Bill Tracking of HB 316 
Consideration and Passage by the House 
Representative Barry Fleming (R-121st) sponsored HB 316 in the 
House, where the bill was assigned to the House Committee on 
Governmental Affairs.31 HB 316 was first read on the House Floor on 
February 15, 2019.32 After three days and nearly ten hours of 
testimony before the Elections Subcommittee, HB 316 advanced to 
the House Government Affairs Committee on February 21, 2019, 
where it was reported out favorably by substitute with a vote of 13 to 
6.33 
During the course of these public deliberations, House Minority 
Leader Bob Trammell (D-132nd), speaking before the House 
Governmental Affairs Elections Subcommittee, vocalized his 
opposition to the bill specifically in regards to the implementation of 
BMDs.34 In doing so, Leader Trammell relied upon and cited the 
opinions of cybersecurity experts who have expressed concerns about 
BMDs’ vulnerabilities to electronic hacking.35 Despite these 
objections, new amendments were also introduced, such as Leader 
Trammell’s proposal to allow voter applicant registrations to still be 
processed, rather than placed in pendency status, when an applicant’s 
registration does not mirror a certain state or federal database 
record.36 Additionally, Representative Scot Turner (R-21st) 
                                                                                                                 
   29.   Video Recording of House Governmental Affairs Election Subcommittee Meeting at 21 min., 19 
sec. (Feb. 19, 2019) (remarks by Rep. Barry Fleming (R-121st)), https://youtu.be/0eAe3YpLVbs 
[hereinafter House Subcommittee Video].  
   30. Id. 
 31. Georgia General Assembly, HB 316, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-
US/Display/20192020/HB/316 [hereinafter HB 316, Bill Tracking]. 
 32. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 316, May 15, 2019. 
 33. Stephen Fowler, Voting Machine Bill Clears House Committee, GPB NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.gpbnews.org/post/voting-machine-bill-clears-house-committee [https://perma.cc/P83T-
955E]. 
 34. House Subcommittee Video, supra note 29, at 1 hr., 12 min., 18 sec. (remarks by Rep. Bob 
Trammell (D-132nd)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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co-authored a risk-limiting project for post-election audits.37 
Representative Turner, however, also unsuccessfully led a failed 
motion to table the bill in order to give subcommittee members more 
time to assess the full scope of HB 316.38 
Democratic opposition continued while the bill was on the House 
Floor; for example, Representative Jasmine Clark (D-108th) 
advocated for a switch to hand-marked paper ballots that would be 
scanned and deposited in a box for audits and recounts.39 In addition 
to eliminating the threat of electronic hacking, Representative Clark 
touted the lower implementation costs to this methodology.40 
Nevertheless, on February 26, 2019, after more than two hours of 
debate,41 the House passed HB 316 by a vote of 101 to 72.42 Voting 
was conducted predominantly along party lines.43 
Consideration and Passage by the Senate 
Senator William Ligon (R-3rd) sponsored HB 316 in the Senate.44 
After its first reading on February 27, 2019, Lieutenant Governor 
Geoff Duncan (R) referred HB 316 to the Senate Committee on 
Ethics.45 On March 7, 2019, the Ethics Committee favorably reported 
the bill by substitute, and the bill was read for a second time the 
following day.46 On March 13, 2019, after a successful party-line 
vote to engross the bill, HB 316 was read a third time and passed 35 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 1 hr., 6 min., 17 sec. (remarks by Rep. Scot Turner (R-21st)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Video Recording of House Proceedings at 57 min., 9 sec. (Feb. 26, 2019) (remarks by Rep. 
Jasmine Clark (D-108th)), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnLGFNWwl4s [hereinafter House 
Proceedings Video]. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 316, Vote #78 (Feb. 26, 2019). 
 43. Id.; see also House Proceedings Video, supra note 29, at 1 hr., 51 min., 8 sec. (remarks by Rep. 
Jasmine Clark (D-108th) and Rep. James Beverly (D-143rd)). During deliberations while the Bill was 
on the House Floor, Democrats, such as Representative Clark, continued to express their security 
concerns regarding the vulnerability of bar codes and BMDs as secure tabulating and audit devices. Id. 
Further, Representative Beverly reiterated objections to the estimated $150 million cost of acquiring 
these new BMDs by calling the equipment instead “ballot money devices” and implying the bill was 
designed to benefit a specific voting equipment vendor. Id. Representative Beverly further echoed 
previous sentiments regarding the safety measures of hand-marked paper ballots and touted the financial 
savings that accompany this method of election voting. Id. 
 44. HB 316, Bill Tracking, supra note 31. 
 45. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 316, May 22, 2019. 
 46. Id. 
9
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to 21,47 each member voting with their respective party.48 The House 
agreed to the Senate substitute the following day by a vote of 101 to 
69.49 
The Act 
The Act amends Chapter 2 of Title 21 of the Official Code of 
Georgia Annotated, relating to primaries and elections, by 
authorizing and requiring a new voting system to be used in all 
elections. It also provides for auditing procedures and updates to the 
voter list maintenance laws. Further, the Act specifies several 
revisions to election processes. The purpose of the Act, according to 
its author, is to “move [Georgia] into the twenty-first century with 
commonsense reform and a straightforward voting system” by 
“uniformly updat[ing] Georgia’s voting system and incorporat[ing] 
an all new paper ballot component.”50 
                                                                                                                 
 47. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 316, May 22, 2019; Georgia Senate Voting 
Record, HB 316, #183, 186 (Mar. 13, 2019). Senate Minority Leader Steve Henson (D-41st) objected 
that HB 316 was out of order for violating both Senate Rule 3-1.4 and O.C.G.A. § 28-5-42 in failing to 
be accompanied with a fiscal note. Video Recording of Senate Proceedings at 1 hr., 15 min., 56 sec. 
(Mar. 13, 2019) (remarks by Sen. Steve Henson (D-41st)), 
https://livestream.com/accounts/26021522/events/7940809/videos/188633474 [hereinafter Senate 
Proceedings Video]. According to the O.C.G.A. § 28-5-42, “[a]ny bill having a significant impact on the 
anticipated revenue or expenditure level of any . . . state agency must be introduced no later than the 
twentieth day of any session,” and the sponsor must request a fiscal note on such bills “by November 1 
of the year preceding the annual convening of the General Assembly in which the bill is to be 
introduced . . . .” The Lieutenant Governor ruled, however, that HB 316’s fiscal impact had been 
sufficiently addressed in the state’s Fiscal Year 2020 budget. Id. at 1 hr., 17 min., 30 sec. (remarks by 
LG Geoff Duncan (R)). Senator Henson further objected to HB 316 as out of order for violating 
O.C.G.A. § 28-5-49, which requires a fiscal note to attach bills with local impact of greater than $5 
million. Id. at 1 hr., 18 min., 07 sec. (remarks by Sen. Henson (D-41st)). Although the Lieutenant 
Governor denied the motion, finding that no evidence was presented that would exceed the aggregate 
cap in O.C.G.A. § 28-5-49, Senator Henson moved to challenge the ruling of the chairperson “out of an 
abundance of caution” and to waive the requirements pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 28-5-49(c)(2). Id. at 1 hr., 
18 min., 24 sec. The Senate voted along party lines to waive requirement of a local impact fiscal note. 
Id. at 1 hr., 20 min., 20 sec. Documents from the Secretary of State’s Office show that the actual costs of 
replacing Georgia’s voting machine system vary greatly by vendor. See Stephen Fowler, Here’s What 
Vendors Say It Would Cost to Replace Georgia’s Voting System, GPB NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://www.gpbnews.org/post/here-s-what-vendors-say-it-would-cost-replace-georgia-s-voting-system 
[https://perma.cc/F8NE-43U9]. 
 48. Georgia Senate Voting Record, HB 316, #186 (Mar. 13, 2019); Senate Proceedings Video, supra 
note 47, at 1 hr., 21 min., 46 sec. (remarks by Sen. William Ligon (R-3rd)). 
 49.  Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 316, #233 (Mar. 14, 2019). 
 50. House Subcommittee Video, supra note 29, at 2 min., 15 sec. (remarks by Rep. Barry Fleming 
(R-121st)). 
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Section 1 
Section 1 revises paragraphs (2), (4.1), and (18) of Code section 
21-2-2 by adding definitions necessary to adopt and implement a new 
voting system, including “ballot scanner” and “electronic ballot 
marker.”51 It also amends the definition of “official ballot” to include 
ballots that are read by ballot scanners, rather than by optical 
scanning tabulators.52 Although the Act now permits an “official 
ballot” to include “paper,” “mechanical,” or “electronic” ballots, in 
the event a paper ballot is scanned by a barcode, the amended 
terminology does not specifically mention whether the physical paper 
ballot or electronic barcode will be the official source.53 Opponents 
to the Act contend this ambiguity amounts to a fatal omission 
because a physical paper ballot may show an elector voted for certain 
candidates, yet an electronic barcode may produce an opposite 
selection because electronic voting equipment has been susceptible to 
cyber hacking or vote manipulation.54 
Section 2 
Section 2 amends paragraph (15) of subsection (a) of Code section 
21-2-50 to remove “direct recording electronic (DRE),” thereby 
allowing the Secretary of State to implement a new type of voting 
system.55 
Section 3 
Section 3 adds a new Code section that details the process for 
independent candidates for the offices of President and Vice 
President to qualify Electoral College electors for President and Vice 
President.56 
                                                                                                                 
 51. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 1, at 8. 
 52. Id. 
    53.   Id.  
 54. House Subcommittee Video, supra note 29, at 1 hr., 12 min., 18 sec. (remarks by Rep. Bob 
Trammell (D-132nd)). 
 55. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 2, at 8. 
 56. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 3, at 8–9. 
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Section 4 
Section 4 revised paragraph (5) of subsection (c) of Code section 
21-2-172 to require that, for the nomination of candidates by 
convention, a certified copy of convention minutes be filed by 
nominees along with a nomination petition, instead of with a notice 
of candidacy.57 
Section 5 
Section 5 amends subsections (a) and (c) of Code section 21-2-216 
and states that electors who will be eighteen years old by the date of 
the primary or election in which they are seeking to vote will now be 
allowed to vote, including by mail and by early voting.58 
Additionally, the new language allows for registration of individuals 
who will be, but are not yet, eighteen years old on or before the date 
of a primary of election, if the person will reach eighteen years of age 
within six months after the day of registration.59 This new provision 
will allow, for example, first-year college students who are not yet 
eighteen years old to register and request an absentee ballot if they 
will be eighteen years old before voting election day.60 
Section 6 
Section 6, known as the “exact match” policy, amends subsections 
(b), (c), and (d) of Code section 21-2-220.1, which previously 
required consistency across all state documents to verify voter 
identity.61 Subsection (b) now allows an applicant to be registered 
even if his or her first name, last name, birth date, driver’s license 
number, or social security number does not match the records of the 
Georgia Department of Driver Services or the federal Social Security 
                                                                                                                 
 57. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 4, at 9. 
 58. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 5, at 9–10. 
 59. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-216(c) (2019). 
 60. James Swift, Elections Officials Highlight Voting, Registration Changes, DAILY TRIB. NEWS 
(May 21, 2019), http://daily-tribune.com/stories/elections-officials-highlight-voting-registration-
changes,22248 [https://perma.cc/N9L5-F8KE]. 
 61. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 6, at 10. 
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Administration.62 Discrepancies between documents, such as 
hyphenated last names, maiden names, and married names, placed 
approximately 50,000 voter registration applications on pending 
status ahead of the 2018 elections.63 Consequently, reducing the strict 
requirements of the previous law became a focal point of the 
legislation. With the passage of the Act, applicants now will become 
active voters, and rather than disqualifying applicants immediately, 
any inconsistencies will be noted in voting records and will only 
require flagged individuals to show photo identification that meets 
exact-match standards before casting a vote.64 Given the enormous 
implications that accompany election results and narrow outcome of 
decisions, the weakening of the “exact match” rule ensures slight 
discrepancies will no longer prevent voter eligibility. 
Section 7 
Section 7 revises Code section 21-2-225 and adds a new 
subsection allowing the Secretary of State to join a nongovernmental 
entity and share and exchange registration information to improve the 
accuracy and efficiency of the voter registration system.65 This new 
section further allows the Secretary of State to share confidential and 
exempt information once becoming a member of such a 
nongovernmental entity.66 Membership, however, is reduced to only 
entities operated and controlled by the participating jurisdictions and 
does not extend to entities under the control of the federal 
government or any entity acting on behalf of the federal 
government.67 Further, the new amendments permit the Secretary of 
State to terminate the membership at any time.68 Moreover, upon 
becoming a member of such a nongovernmental entity, the 
Department of Driver Services is permitted to share driver’s license 
and identification card information related to voter eligibility to the 
                                                                                                                 
 62. § 21-2-220.1(b). 
 63. Changes Coming to Georgia, supra note 18. 
 64. § 21-2-220.1. 
 65. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 7, at 10–11. 
 66. § 21-2-225(d)(1)–(2). 
 67. Id. § 21-2-225(d)(3). 
 68. Id. 
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Secretary of State to further assess voter registration information.69 
Because of the sensitivity of personal information shared, any 
information received in conjunction with the Secretary of State’s 
membership is required to be confidential and will only be made 
available subject to a court order.70 
As a result of the amendment, Georgia joined the Electronic 
Registration Information Center (ERIC), which serves to share voter 
registration information amongst various participating states.71 By 
sharing information, ERIC protects the accuracy and current status of 
state voting lists and aims to prevent election fraud.72 Upon joining 
ERIC, Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger (R) described the 
newfound membership status as a “tremendous step forward for the 
integrity of Georgia’s voter rolls” and a move that brings Georgia “to 
the forefront of election security.”73 Notably, ERIC does not remove 
individuals from any state voting registry, but rather aims to prevent 
individual voters from registering to vote in multiple states across the 
country and notifies its members of such dual registration.74 
Section 8 
Section 8 amends subsection (a) of Code section 21-2-230 and 
removes the reference to DRE voting equipment to allow any elector 
of the county or municipality to challenge the right of any other 
elector of the county or municipality, whose name appears on the list 
of electors, to vote.75 The new language allows for such challenges to 
be made under the new voting system. 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. § 21-2-225(d). 
 70. Id. § 21-2-225(d)(5). 
 71. Swift, supra note 60. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Mark Niesse, Deeper Findings: Georgia Joints Multi-State Voter Registration and Cancellation 
Effort, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 22, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—
politics/georgia-joins-multi-state-voter-registration-and-cancellation-
effort/Z0yLAHuQLqH2KsmTPRh1aJ/ [https://perma.cc/8SQU-4R8P] [hereinafter Deeper Findings]. 
 74. Id. 
 75. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 8, at 11. 
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Section 9 
Section 9 amends subsection (c) of Code Section 21-2-231 and 
provides that the Secretary of State shall transmit the names of 
individuals who have been convicted of a felony to the appropriate 
county board of registrars.76 Once received, the county board of 
registrars will mail a notice to the felons’ last known address and 
alert such people that the county board of registrar has been informed 
of a felony and conviction and will remove the convicted felon from 
the electoral list thirty days after the notice date.77 However, the Act 
provides that the thirty-day removal period may be paused if such 
individuals request a hearing before the board of registrars to discuss 
his or her removal.78 This new amendment essentially creates a more 
streamlined process for informing convicted felons of their removal 
from the state voter roll but, in conjunction with the overall spirit of 
the Act, also seeks to prevent unauthorized or unwarranted voter 
removal by giving such individuals the opportunity to communicate 
directly with the board of registrars. 
Section 10 
Section 10 of the Act revises subsection (b) of Code section 
21-2-232 and relates to the process by which the Secretary of State or 
the board of registrars may remove a voter from the Georgia state 
registry once a Georgia resident moves to another state and registers 
to vote in that state.79 Previously, the language provided that once a 
former Georgian moved to another state and registered to vote in the 
different state, the Secretary of State or board of registrars could 
remove such elector’s name from the list of electors without 
notifying the voter, so long as the new state registration officials sent 
a notice of cancellation reflecting the registration of the elector in the 
new state.80 The amendment to paragraph (b)(1), however, now 
provides that the Secretary of State or board of registrars can only 
                                                                                                                 
 76. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 9, at 11. 
 77. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-231(c)(2) (2019). 
 78. Id. 
 79. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 10, at 12. 
 80. Id. 
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remove a voter in such a circumstance without providing a 
confirmation notice when the new state officials send “a notice of 
cancellation reflecting the registration of the elector in the other state, 
which includes a copy of such elector’s voter registration application 
bearing the elector’s signature.”81 Thus, the Act effectively adds an 
additional requirement for removing a voter from the Georgia voting 
registry without notice. Additionally, this amendment effectively 
works in tandem with Georgia’s newfound ability to join a 
nongovernmental voter information agency, such as ERIC, and 
allows the state to actively receive and share voter registration 
information amongst twenty-five other states.82 
Further, paragraph (b)(2) was added to provide guidance for when 
a state sends the Georgia Secretary of State or board of registrars 
notice without including a copy of an elector’s voter registration 
application that bears the elector’s signature.83 In such instances, this 
subsection requires that the Secretary of State or board of registrars 
must send a confirmation notice to the elector.84 
Section 11 
Section 11 of the Act amends subsection (a) of Code section 
21-2-234 and increases the time for which a voter, with whom the 
state has had no contact, may be considered inactive for voting 
purposes.85 Previously the Code defined the term “no contact” to 
mean instances where an elector: has not filed an updated voter 
registration card; has not filed a change of name or address; has not 
signed a petition required by law to be verified by the election 
superintendent of a county or municipality or the Secretary of State; 
has not signed a voter’s certificate; or has not confirmed the elector’s 
continuation at the same address during the preceding three calendar 
years.86 The Act amends paragraph (a)(1) to include instances where 
an elector “has not submitted an absentee ballot application or voted 
an absentee ballot” to the list of activities that constitute “no 
                                                                                                                 
 81. § 21-2-232(b)(1). 
 82. Deeper Findings, supra note 73. 
 83. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 10, at 12. 
 84. § 21-2-232(b)(2). 
 85. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 11, at 12. 
 86. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234(a)(1) (Supp. 2017). 
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contact.”87 Further, paragraph (a)(1) increases the temporal 
requirements that constitute “no contact” from three years to five 
years.88 Georgia is only one of a handful of states that has a “Use it or 
Lose it” voter rule where inactive voters are removed from state 
voting registries.89 Previously, in July 2017, over 107,000 Georgians 
were removed from state voter rolls due to inactive voting histories.90 
Effectively, Georgia voters will now be removed from the state voter 
registry after nine years of inactivity, whereas the previous law 
allowed for removal after seven years. 
Section 12 
Section 12 of the Act amends subsection (b) and requires an 
additional notice letter be sent to an elector’s address and provides a 
timeline for notifying inactive voters who have made no contact of 
their impending removal from the list of electors.91 The Act provides 
that “not less than 30 nor more than 60 days prior to the date on 
which the elector is to be removed from the inactive list of electors, 
the board of registrars shall mail a notice to the address on the 
elector’s registration record.”92 This amendment augments the 
changes made to the “Use it or Lose it” provisions in subsection (a) 
of Code section 21-2-234 and simply provides another mechanism 
for further prolonging the period for which a voter will remain on the 
voting rolls. 
Section 13 
Section 13 amends subsection (c) of Code Section 21-2-262 and 
increases the notice time that must be provided for the “division, 
                                                                                                                 
 87. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 11, at 12. 
 88. § 21-2-232(a)(1). 
 89. Johnny Kauffman, Georgia Governor Signs Law to Slow ‘Use It or Lose It’ Voter Purges, APM 
REP. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.apmreports.org/story/2019/04/11/georgia-brian-kemp-use-it-or-lose-
it-voting-law-changes [https://perma.cc/8UYX-CF4S]. 
 90. Morgan Gstalter, 107,000 Purged from Georgia Voter Rolls for Not Voting in Past Elections, 
HILL (Oct. 19, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/412195-georgia-purged-more-
than-100000-people-from-voter-rolls-because-there-didnt [https://perma.cc/J8RT-DWJ7]. 
 91. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 12, at 12–13. 
 92. § 21-2-235(b). 
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redivision, alteration, formation, or consolidation of precincts.”93 
Previously, any plan to change or consolidate the number of precincts 
required at least ten days’ notice in the legal organ of the county.94 
The amendment increases this notice period to at least thirty days and 
further adds the requirement that a copy of such notice shall be 
immediately submitted to the Secretary of State.95 Instances of 
last-minute precinct closings occurred before the 2018 elections, 
which in turn raised questions concerning voter suppression. 
Randolph County, for example, closed seven of the county’s nine 
voting precincts just days before the November election.96 Although 
the Randolph County Board of Elections claimed the closings 
centered on American’s with Disability Act (ADA) compliance 
issues and potential health hazards, voting activists claim the poll 
closures were an attempt to suppress voter turnout in a county with a 
60% African-American population.97 The increased notice time 
should give voters more time to prepare and coordinate their 
commute to available precincts and may help alleviate some concerns 
about voter suppression. 
Section 14 
Section 14 amends Code section 21-2-265 and prevents counties 
from changing the location of a polling place during the sixty days 
before a general or primary election or changing the location of a 
polling place in the thirty-day period preceding any special primary, 
special election, or runoff from such types of elections.98 The Act, 
however, provides that in the event of an emergency or event that 
renders a polling place “unavailable for use,” such temporal 
                                                                                                                 
 93. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 13, at 13. 
 94. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-262(c) (Supp. 2017). 
 95. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-262(c) (2019). 
 96. Legislature Takes Holistic Look at Voting System, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019, 
3:57 PM), https://www.savannahnow.com/opinion/20190221/editorial-legislature-takes-holistic-look-at-
voting-system [https://perma.cc/U6HY-NHVN]. 
 97. Ashley Bridges, Georgia County to Close 7 of 9 Voting Precincts, Civil Rights Attorney Calls it 
‘Voter Suppression’, WJBF (Aug. 16, 2018, 4:23 PM), https://www.wjbf.com/news/georgia-
news/georgia-county-to-close-7-of-9-voting-precincts-civil-rights-attorney-calls-it-voter-suppression/ 
[https://perma.cc/LS3G-85T5]. 
 98. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 14, at 13. 
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restrictions are inapplicable.99 The closing and changing of polling 
locations in the weeks prior to the 2018 Georgia election cycle 
became a hot topic between Democrats and Republicans as thousands 
of polling places were closed while others suffered staffing shortages 
for alleged cost savings.100 Although cost savings were cited as the 
driving force for closing many of the polling locations, critics of the 
former policy claimed the widespread dissolution was, on the 
contrary, a political tool used to prevent voting in predominately 
African-American neighborhoods.101 This new amendment 
effectively locks in polling places before the election and ensures 
voters will not unexpectedly encounter vacant polling locations. 
Further, unexpected or abrupt polling closures compound voting 
inefficiencies by increasing wait times at active polling locations and 
thus effectively discourage voting. 
Section 15 
Section 15 adds “electronic ballot markers” to provisions for 
polling places but does not remove the ability to have direct 
recording electronic units.102 
Section 16 
Subsection (b) of Code section 21-2-286 is amended to provide 
that the Secretary of State will prescribe how ballots must be 
designed to “ensure ease of reading by electors.”103 This additional 
language requires the Secretary of State to select a vendor for the 
new voting equipment that produces a ballot that is clearly and easily 
                                                                                                                 
 99. § 21-2-265(f). 
 100. Mark Nichols, Closed Voting Sites Hit Minority Counties Harder for Busy Midterm Elections, 
USA TODAY (Oct. 30, 2018, 7:06 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/10/30/midterm-
elections-closed-voting-sites-impact-minority-voter-turnout/1774221002/ [https://perma.cc/HB3P-
NFSG]. 
 101. Matt Vasilogambros, Polling Places in Black Communities Continue to Close Ahead of 
November Elections, GOVERNING (Sept. 5, 2018, 9:51 AM), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/sl-polling-place-close-ahead-of-november-elections-black-
voters.html [https://perma.cc/F6BU-Y3JD]. 
 102. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 15, at 14. 
 103. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 16, at 14. 
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legible for voters.104 Although on the surface this new provision may 
seem straightforward, voter verification of the new, printed ballots 
was a central issue during the research and legislative drafting 
process.105 As such, depending on the vendor that is ultimately 
selected, the format and readability of the new paper ballots could 
become contested topics in the future if electors are not comfortable 
with these paper receipts. 
Section 17 
Section 17 revises Code section 21-2-293 relating to errors and 
omissions that occur in the printing of official ballots or in the 
programing display of the official ballots by adding “electronic ballot 
markers” to the type of voting system that election officials and 
courts may correct if necessary and under specified conditions.106 
The change in this section is merely a procedural addition necessary 
to ensure an election superintendent can correct any discovered 
mistakes or omissions occurring in the printing or programming 
display of electronic ballot markers. 
Section 18 
Section 18 revises subsection (a) of Code section 21-2-300 and 
stipulates that once the Secretary of State certifies new voting 
equipment as safe and practicable for use, all federal, state, and 
county general primaries and general elections, as well as special 
primaries and special elections, must be conducted with the use of 
scanning ballots.107 These scanning ballots must be marked by 
electronic ballot markers and tabulated using ballot scanners for 
voting at polls and absentee ballots cast in person, provided that such 
electronic ballot markers must produce paper ballots marked with the 
elector’s choices in a readable format.108 Further, paragraph (a)(3) 
requires the state to furnish electronic ballot markers and ballot 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. 
 105. SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 15–16. 
 106. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 17, at 14–15. 
 107. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 18, at 15. 
 108. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300 (2019). 
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scanners to each county as soon as possible.109 Such equipment must 
be certified by the United States Election Assistance Commission 
prior to purchase, lease, or acquisition.110 Paragraph (a)(3) also 
provides that the governing authorities of a county or municipality 
may choose to acquire, purchase, or lease additional electronic ballot 
markers and ballot scanners at their own expense.111 Moreover, 
paragraph (a)(4) grants the Secretary of State the power to test and 
evaluate the new equipment in primaries and elections occurring in 
Georgia.112 
In addition to their concerns about election accuracy, critics 
protested the Act from an economic perspective.113 The Act 
effectively requires the Secretary of State to purchase a total of 
nearly 40,000 new touchscreen computers, printers, and scanners.114 
Further, the new BDMs will require training for new supervisors as 
well as ongoing software licensing renewals and upgrades.115 To 
finance the estimated $150 million cost of these expenditures, the 
House authorized for $150 million in twenty-year bonds to cover the 
purchase.116 
Due to concerns about verifiability and accuracy of BMDs, many 
critics believe the lack of improvement in voting integrity does not 
justify the investment in any new electronic equipment.117 Rather, 
they contend that a return to hand-written ballots is not only a safer, 
more reliable voting mechanism, but additionally is a cheaper 
alternative.118 
Moreover, opponents contend that although the state will furnish 
the original equipment, the Act will increase operating costs for 
                                                                                                                 
 109. § 21-2-300(a)(3). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. § 21-2-300(a)(4). 
 113. Jeanne Dufort, H.B. 316 Voting Machine Bill a Mistake, INSIDERADVANTAGE (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://insideradvantage.com/2019/03/05/h-b-316-voting-machine-bill-a-mistake/ 
[https://perma.cc/L25P-XX53]. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Wes Wolfe, Contentious Voting Bill Passes Senate, BRUNSWICK NEWS (Mar. 14, 2019), 
https://thebrunswicknews.com/news/local_news/contentious-voting-bill-passes-senate/article_13c51cc5-
7a20-5512-9f6d-bf3a0d88348c.html [https://perma.cc/JQ7R-XEL7]. 
 117. House Proceedings Video, supra note 39, at 1 hr., 51 min., 8 sec. (remarks by Rep. James 
Beverly (D-143rd)). 
 118. Id. at 57 min., 9 sec. (remarks by Rep. Jasmine Clark (D-108th)). 
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elections due to additional printing costs from the generation of a 
paper ballot, periodic software license renewals, and increased audit 
costs.119 Traditionally, counties bear the costs of these expenditures, 
and the Act notably lacks any provision or guidance on who will 
account for these future expenses.120 
Further, the Act is silent on the type of BMD that will be 
furnished, and instead broadly grants the Secretary of State power to 
contract with a voting machine company to provide the equipment.121 
Although no vendor has been selected, voting machine company 
Election Systems and Software (ES&S) is widely considered the 
frontrunner for the contract.122 Opponents, however, have identified a 
potential conflict of interest between ES&S and Georgia Governor 
and former Secretary of State Brian Kemp’s deputy chief of staff, 
Charles Harper.123 Mr. Harper was a registered lobbyist for ES&S 
until June 2018, and his relationship and influence have drawn 
criticisms of favoritism and self-dealing.124 
Section 19 
Section 19 amends paragraph (5) of Code section 21-2-365 to state 
that a ballot scanner, and not an optical scanning tabulator, shall 
preclude electors from voting for more candidates or more times than 
allowed.125 This amendment updates the Code language to provide 
for the same preclusions for ballot scanners that were present for 
optical scanning tabulators as it pertains to extra-counting of votes 
for candidates or offices. 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Dufort, supra note 113. 
 120. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 18, at 15–16. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Anoa Changa, Georgia’s Voting Machine ‘Reform’ Is a Threat to Free and Fair Elections, 
REWIRE.NEWS (Apr. 3, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2019/04/03/georgias-voting-
machine-reform-is-a-threat-to-free-and-fair-elections/ [https://perma.cc/6LYG-PC2X]. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 19, at 16. 
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Section 20 
Section 20 amends Code section 21-2-367 and reduces the number 
of voting booths per electors in a given county or municipality from 
one voting booth per 200 electors to one voting booth per 250 
electors.126 Section 20 further eliminates language that discontinued 
the use of paper ballots in Georgia in 2002.127 The reduction in the 
number of voting machines per elector is notable in that it could 
foreseeably lead to longer waiting lines, as less machines are 
available to accommodate electors. Although it is unclear if the new 
machines will decrease the time it takes to cast a vote, this reduction 
in available voting machines runs somewhat counter to the Act’s 
general themes of improving voting accuracy and efficiency, 
particularly as voter turnout is only expected to increase in the 
coming years.128 Presumably, the reduction in available machines is a 
cost measure, as the costs associated with providing the new voting 
equipment is lessened by the reduction in the ratio of voter machines 
to registered electors. 
Section 21 
Section 21 amends Code section 21-2-372 to require ballots to be 
printed in a way suitable for ballot scanners instead of optical 
scanners.129 This amendment merely updates the Code to 
accommodate the specific nuances that accompany ballot scanners as 
it relates to the printing of ballots and ballot arrangements. 
Section 22 
Section 22 further amends Code section 21-3-372 to require ballots 
to be of suitable size and construction so as to permit reading by 
ballot scanners instead of a tabulating machine.130 Again, this 
                                                                                                                 
 126. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 20, at 16. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Mark Niesse, Voter Registration Surges in Georgia Ahead of 2020 Elections, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/voter-registration-
surges-georgia-ahead-2020-elections/NVKOTit4KEtsTHoXtd6ddN/# [https://perma.cc/3N93-29JL]. 
 129. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 21, at 16. 
 130. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 22, at 17. 
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amendment merely updates the Code to require ballot design, size, 
and stock to accommodate the processing requirements associated 
with ballot scanners as opposed to a tabulated machine. 
Section 23 
Section 23 amends subsections (a) and (b) of Code section 
21-2-374 to require the proper programming to be placed in each 
ballot scanner, instead of a tabulator, and to require the ballot 
scanners to be tested and approved prior to use by electors in each 
primary and general election.131 Section 23 further provides that a 
ballot scanner will not be approved for use in a primary or election 
until it has produced an errorless count.132 
Section 24 
Section 24 amends Code section 21-2-375 and requires election 
superintendents to ensure directions are prominently posted with 
signs reminding electors to verify their ballot choices prior to 
inserting the scanning ballot into the ballot scanner and stating that 
sample ballots are available upon request.133 This additional review 
mechanism was a point of central contention in the drafting process, 
as opponents of the Act contend that embedded barcodes are still 
vulnerable to hacking and voters will not necessarily catch errors on 
the printed ballots.134 These criticisms echo Dr. Wenke Lee’s 
findings that voters have not been empirically shown to verify ballots 
before submission, and thus any increase in voter confidence from 
the switch to a paper receipt is merely illusory.135 Instead, these 
opponents maintain hand-marked paper ballots, which would be 
scanned and deposited in a box for audits and recounts, represent the 
safest and most reliable voting mechanism.136 Although the Act was 
                                                                                                                 
 131. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 23, at 17. 
 132. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-374(b) (2019). 
 133. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 24, at 17–18. 
 134. House Subcommittee Video, supra note 29, at 1 hr., 12 min., 18 sec. (remarks by Rep. Bob 
Trammell (D-132nd)). 
 135. SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 15–16. 
 136. House Proceedings Video, supra note 39, at 57 min., 9 sec. (remarks by Rep. Jasmine Clark (D-
108th)). 
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passed, the language and overall requirements of this section are 
likely to be a point of contention going forward as critics of the Act 
are likely to reassert their contentions that posted signs and reminders 
are insufficient, impractical, or futile measures to ensure a voter 
accurately and thoroughly reviews every selection that was chosen. 
Section 25 
Section 25 amends Code section 21-2-377, which provides for an 
election superintendent to designate a person to have custody of 
voting machines for storage purposes when the machines are not in 
use and to provide compensation to such designated person.137 
Additionally, Section 25 replaces “scanning tabulators” with “ballot 
scanners.”138 Notably, however, the new language is silent as to the 
source of the funding for these storage costs, and also entirely 
neglects to detail any costs associated with transporting the new 
equipment to the storage locations. Critics of the Act fear local 
counties and municipalities will be forced to bear these operational 
costs which represent separate expenses not contained in the State’s 
estimated $150 million budget for this new equipment.139 
Additionally, proponents of hand-marked paper ballots view such 
ancillary costs associated with the new voting equipment as entirely 
needless and a drain on taxpayer dollars.140 
Section 26 
Section 26 adds Code subsections 21-2-379.21 through 
21-2-379.26 to ensure voters using BMDs have the same access to 
information and privacy that existed under the former DRE 
statutes.141 Additionally, subsection 21-2-379.23 now requires ballots 
to include a candidate’s political party or affiliation in partisan 
elections.142 It further requires ballots to have human readable text 
                                                                                                                 
 137. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 25, at 18. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Dufort, supra note 113; see also House Proceedings Video, supra note 39, at 57 min., 9 sec. 
(remarks by Rep. Jasmine Clark (D-108th)). 
 140. Dufort, supra note 113. 
 141. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 26, at 18–22. 
 142. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.23(c)(5) (2019). 
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regarding potential voter selections and to identify instances when a 
voter has not voted for a particular office, constitutional amendment, 
or other selection appearing on a ballot.143 
Importantly, subsection 21-2-379.23(d) specifies that the paper 
ballot marked and printed by the electronic ballot marker constitutes 
the official ballot and will be used for recount and audit purposes.144 
Because the type of BMD to be used is not specified in the Act, 
opponents who envision a barcode being used to tabulate votes 
desired more clarity and specificity as to what ballot will be used in 
such events, considering the Act only addresses “the paper ballot 
marked” and does not specifically preclude reliance on embedded 
barcode information.145 Stemming from their concern over the 
security and vulnerability of barcodes to tabulate votes, opponents 
believe reliance on a barcode for recount in audit purposes is useless 
and unverifiable.146 Thus, opponents lament the fact that the law does 
not specifically prohibit barcode data from being used in the event of 
a recount.147 
Section 27 
Section 27 amends subparagraph (a)(1)(D) and subsection (b) of 
Code section 21-2-381.148 Subparagraph (a)(1)(D) allows “electors in 
custody in a jail or other detention facility in the county or 
municipality” to request an absentee by mail ballot be mailed to an 
address other than the permanent mailing address of the elector.149 
Previously, only physically disabled electors were granted this 
exception.150 Further, paragraph (b)(3) provides a new process for 
instances where an absentee ballot application contains a mismatched 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Id. § 21-2-379.25(a). 
 144. Id. § 21-2-379.23(d). 
 145. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 26, at 18–22. 
 146. Anjali Enjeti, Governor Kemp is Turning Georgia into Gilead, DAME MAG. (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.damemagazine.com/2019/04/01/governor-kemp-is-turning-georgia-into-gilead/ 
[https://perma.cc/7P4L-AX5J]. 
 147. Gloria Tatum, Georgia Approves New E-Voting Regime, but Will Paper Record Be Utilized?, 
ATLANTA PROGRESSIVE NEWS (May 2, 2019), http://atlantaprogressivenews.com/2019/05/02/georgia-
approves-new-e-voting-regime-questions-issues-remain/ [https://perma.cc/DDP2-BRJC]. 
 148. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 27, at 22–23. 
 149. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(D) (2019). 
 150. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(D) (Supp. 2017). 
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signature.151 The amendment provides that an absentee ballot 
application will not be rejected due to “an apparent mismatch 
signature between the signature of the elector on the application and 
the signature of the elector on file with the board of registrars.”152 
When such an instance occurs, the elector will have the opportunity 
to cure the signature discrepancy “by submitting an affidavit to the 
board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk along with a copy of one 
of the forms of identification enumerated in subsection (c) of Code 
[s]ection 21-2-417 before the close of the period for verifying 
provisional ballots contained in subsection (c) of Code [s]ection 
21-2-419.”153 
Section 28 
Section 28 amends subsection (a) of Code section 21-2-382 to 
provide that counties will be able to use nongovernmental buildings 
as early voting locations if the buildings are used as voting locations 
on Election Day.154 The addition of the new language will potentially 
allow for more physical locations to be used during the early voting 
process while still ensuring these locations are suitable from an 
occupational, safety, and privacy perspective. As voter turnout 
continues to grow, many electors prefer to avoid the long waiting 
lines that are frequently present on Election Day, and thus this 
amendment will allow for better accessibility to accommodate early 
voters.155 
Section 29 
Section 29 amends Code section 21-2-383 to provide that in 
jurisdictions where electronic ballot markers are used in polling 
places on Election Day, persons casting absentee ballots in person at 
a registrar or absentee ballot clerk’s office shall use electronic ballot 
markers.156 
                                                                                                                 
 151. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 27, at 23. 
 152. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(b)(3) (2019). 
 153. Id. 
 154. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 28, at 24. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 29, at 24. 
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Section 30 
Section 30 amends subsections (b) and (e) and paragraph (1) of 
subsection (c) of Code section 21-2-384, clarifies the information 
appearing on the envelopes containing absentee ballots, simplifies the 
oath information to be provided for absentee ballots, and expands the 
types of elections where electronic ballot delivery is available to 
overseas and military voters.157 From a procedural standpoint, an 
absentee voter receives two envelopes for each absentee ballot to 
permit the placing of one envelope within the other and both within 
the mailing envelope.158 Printed on the smaller envelope includes the 
words “Official Absentee Ballot.”159 On the back of the larger of the 
two envelopes to be enclosed within the mailing envelope shall be 
printed the form of oath of the elector and the oath for persons 
assisting electors.160 The new language to subsection (b) now 
requires the larger of the two envelopes to display the elector’s name 
and voter registration number.161 
Further, under paragraph (c)(1), the oath requirements that 
accompany an absentee ballot have been simplified to no longer 
require an elector to provide his or her residential address or year of 
birth, or, in the case of a person assisting an elector, the relationship 
between the parties.162 Moreover, subsection (e) expands electronic 
ballot delivery to overseas and military electors to include not only 
federal elections, but also state and county elections, primaries, and 
runoffs.163 
Section 31 
Section 31 amends Code section 21-2-385, which relates to 
procedures for early voting and voting by absentee ballot.164 It 
amends subsection (a) to prohibit ballot harvesting by persons 
                                                                                                                 
 157. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 30, at 24–26. 
 158. Id. at 24–25. 
 159. Id. at 24. 
 160. Id. 
 161. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-384(b) (2019). 
 162. Id. § 21-2-384(c)(1). 
 163. Id. § 21-2-384(e). 
 164. Id. § 21-2-385(a). 
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unaffiliated with the voter, and now requires the elector to personally 
mail or personally deliver his or her sealed official absentee ballot, 
provided that the elector’s relatives, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, 
mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, or an 
individual residing in the household of the elector may still mail or 
deliver the sealed ballot on the elector’s behalf.165 For disabled 
electors, however, a caregiver, regardless of whether their residence 
is the same as the elector’s, may mail or deliver the elector’s absentee 
ballot.166 For electors in jail or other detention facilities, any 
employee of that jail or facility and who has custody of the elector 
may mail or deliver the elector’s absentee ballot.167 
Subsection (b) now allows any person of a physically disabled or 
illiterate elector’s choice to assist the elector in preparing his or her 
ballot, so long as the person assisting is not the elector’s employer or 
an officer or agent of the elector’s union.168 The elector may not 
receive help from anyone whose name appears on the ballot as a 
candidate in a primary, general election, or runoff.169 This provision 
adopts the federal election voter assistance standard for disabled and 
illiterate electors to also cover state and local elections during 
absentee voting. 
Additionally, Section 31 amends subsection (d) to set the second 
Monday prior to a runoff as the deadline to begin early voting.170 
Section 32 
Section 32 revises subparagraphs (a)(1)(C) and (a)(1)(D) of Code 
section 21-2-386. Subparagraph (C) provides a method for an elector 
to cure issues with absentee ballots.171 The elector may submit an 
affidavit to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk along with 
a form of identification to cure a failure to sign the oath, an invalid 
signature, or missing information.172 The affidavit must affirm that 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. 
 166. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-385(a) (2019). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. § 21-2-385(b). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. § 21-2-385(d). 
 171. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 32, at 29. 
 172. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386(a)(1)(C). 
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the rejected elector submitted the absentee ballot in question and state 
that the elector is registered and qualified to vote in the primary, 
general election, or runoff in question.173 If the board of registrars or 
absentee ballot clerk determines the affidavit and form of 
identification are sufficient, then the elector’s absentee ballot will be 
recorded.174 During the November 2018 elections, election officials 
rejected over 7,000 absentee ballots due to signature mismatches, 
missing birth dates and addresses, and incorrectly marked absentee 
ballot envelopes.175 The changes made in this section mirror those in 
Code section 21-2-220.1, which aimed to weaken the “exact-match” 
policy that was responsible for the removal of over 50,000 separate 
voters during the 2018 elections.176 Again, given the volume of 
discarded absentee ballots and narrow election outcomes, this 
amendment better helps ensure voting outcomes represent the will of 
Georgia voters. 
Further, subparagraph (D) adds a notification procedure for 
absentee ballots that are devoid of the requisite identification 
information and which subsequently are deemed provisional 
ballots.177 The amendment requires the board of registrars or absentee 
ballot clerk to promptly notify such an elector that his or her absentee 
ballot has been deemed a provisional ballot and that the elector must 
provide information on the necessary identification forms, as well as 
the mechanics and timeline for providing such information to verify 
the ballot.178 
Section 33 
Section 33 amends Code section 21-2-388 regarding the 
cancellation of absentee ballots for voters who appear at an election 
precinct during primaries and elections.179 First, Code section 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Mark Niesse, Election Battle Over Discarded Absentee Ballots Ends with New Georgia Law, 
GOVERNING (July 12, 2019, 8:27 AM), https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/tns-georgia-absentee-
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 177. § 21-2-386(a)(1)(D). 
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 179. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 33, at 30. 
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21-2-388 now allows electors who have received an absentee ballot 
but who have not yet returned the ballot to cancel the absentee ballot 
and vote in person.180 Second, paragraph (2) requires the elector to 
first have the managers of the election precinct, the registrars, or the 
absentee ballot clerk certify that the elector’s ballot has not yet been 
received by the board of registrars before the elector may vote in 
person at the election precinct.181 It further requires the elector to 
surrender the absentee ballot to the poll manager or, if the elector did 
not bring the absentee ballot to the election precinct, the elector must 
destroy the absentee ballot after casting the in-person vote.182 
Section 34 
Section 34 amends subsection (b) of Code section 21-2-409 and 
assists electors who cannot read English or who have disabilities.183 
Subsection (b) removes the criteria relating to elections in which 
there is a federal candidate on the ballot and now applies the federal 
election voter assistance standard to state and local elections on 
Election Day.184 As amended, the Act now provides help to any 
elector who is entitled to receive assistance in voting under Code 
section 21-2-409 and removes the provision that “no person shall 
assist more than ten such electors in any primary, election, or runoff 
covered by this paragraph.”185 Previously, during elections where 
only state candidates appeared on a ballot, voters with a limited 
English proficiency could only use an interpreter who was a close 
family member, caretaker, or voter registered in the same precinct.186 
The Act now allows such voters who require interpreters to bring 
nearly anyone to help cast a ballot and mirrors the standard that 
previously existed for federal elections.187 Further, the amendment 
calls for “notice of the availability of such assistance [to] be 
                                                                                                                 
 180. § 21-2-388. 
 181. Id. § 21-2-388(2). 
 182. Id. 
 183. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 34, at 30–31. 
 184. Id. at 31. 
 185. Id. 
 186. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409(b)(1) (Supp. 2017). 
 187. Mark Niesse, Lawsuit Fights Restrictions on Interpreters in Georgia Runoff, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/lawsuit-fights-
restrictions-interpreters-georgia-runoff/iLVggX2SOawyVhNyC5fzyJ/ [https://perma.cc/DEH4-59Z3]. 
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prominently posted at each polling place.”188 The new assistance 
standard drastically increases the ability for a voter who requires 
assistance to receive help in federal, state, and local elections. 
Although employers and union representatives are still prevented 
from aiding a voter, voters who qualify for assistance can now 
receive familial and nonfamilial assistance.189 
Section 35 
Section 35 amends subsection (e) of Code section 21-2-413 to 
extend the general prohibition of cameras or other recording devices 
in polling places while voting is taking place to cover instances 
where an elector is using an electronic ballot marker.190 The Act, 
however, maintains the provision that allows the poll manager, at his 
or her discretion, to allow such devices under certain conditions and 
subject to certain limitations.191 Additionally, poll officials are still 
permitted to use telephones and other monitoring devices for official 
purposes.192 
Section 36 
Section 36 amends subsection (f) of Code section 21-2-417.1, and 
now permits a Georgia voter identification card to remain valid even 
if a voter moves to another address, so long as that voter still resides 
in the same county and otherwise remains qualified to vote.193 If a 
voter moves to another Georgia residence outside of the county in 
which he or she was registered to vote, that voter must then surrender 
his or her voter identification card to the board of registrars of the 
county of his or her new residence.194 
                                                                                                                 
 188. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409(b) (2019). 
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 190. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 35, at 31. 
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Section 37 
Section 37 amends subsection (e) of Code section 21-2-418 to 
permit registrars to provide a free access system via internet website, 
in addition to toll-free telephone numbers, for electors to check 
whether their provisional ballot was counted and, if it was not 
counted, the reason that the provisional ballot was rejected.195 
Section 37 further requires counties timely report to the Secretary of 
State when they receive a provisional ballot and whether they 
counted it or rejected it, and, if it was rejected, the basis of that 
rejection.196 The addition of these procedures stems partly from the 
2018 gubernatorial election, where a federal judge ordered election 
officials to review thousands of provisional ballots that were not 
counted.197 In the midst of the close election, the judge provided for 
the creation of a voter hotline where voters could call in to check if 
their votes were counted.198 Further, the judge requested election 
officials to review voter registrations and ordered reports from the 
state government related to the uptick in provisional ballots from 
previous years.199 
Section 38 
Section 38 amends Code section 21-2-419 to allow provisional 
ballots to be cast on the same ballot type as is ordinarily used, rather 
than the ballot used for mail-in absentee ballots.200 Section 38 also 
amends subsection (b), which now requires a county’s board of 
registrars to make a good faith effort in determining whether a voter 
who casts a provisional ballot is entitled to vote in the primary or 
election, and defines what “good faith effort” shall include.201 The 
purpose of Section 38 is to provide uniformity by clearly stating that 
                                                                                                                 
 195. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 37, at 32. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Mark Niesse, Judge Orders Review of Provisional Ballots in Georgia Election, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/judge-orders-
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registrars should use all available information in reviewing whether a 
provisional ballot should be counted, including information from the 
Department of Driver Services, Department of Family and Children 
Services, Department of Natural Resources, public libraries, and any 
other government agency.202 
Section 38 also adds language to subsection (d) that requires 
timely notification of the status of persons’ provisional ballots and, if 
the person was found to be qualified to vote, the registrars must 
continue to provide the person with a voter registration form that 
shall add them to the electors list.203 Overall, the changes made in 
this section parallel many of the changes contained throughout the 
Act, and seek to promote a more thorough, accurate, and timely 
voting process. 
Section 39 
Section 39 amends Code section 21-2-482 to replace optical 
scanners with ballot scanners and requires superintendents 
sufficiently prepare absentee ballots in advance.204 The section 
further permits the form for the ballots’ labels to conform with the 
requirements of Article 9 of this Chapter or in such a form that will 
allow the ballot to be machine tabulated.205 The amendments to this 
section are procedure-oriented and officially sync the provisions 
contained in the law to conform with the introduction of the new 
voting equipment.206 
Section 40 
Section 40 amends subsection (k) of Code section 21-2-493 and 
extends the deadline for certifying elections to the second Friday 
following the date the election was held.207 The deadline was 
formerly on the Monday following the date of the election, and the 
deadline extension will grant election officials more time to audit the 
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results from an analytical perspective.208 Further, the amendment 
grants the Secretary of State discretionary power to extend the 
deadline if necessary to complete a precertification audit.209 
Section 41 
Section 41 amends subsections (a) and (c) of Code section 
21-2-495, reducing the percentage threshold that triggers an 
automatic recount from 1.0% to 0.5% and authorizing the State 
Election Board (SEB) to promulgate rules and regulations for 
implementing and administering the recount process.210 Previously, a 
losing candidate was permitted to request an automatic recount if the 
outcome was determined by 1% or less.211 Now, the Act lowers the 
threshold for a candidate to be entitled to an automatic recount to 
0.5%.212 In the hotly contested 2018 gubernatorial election, the 
previous 1.0% automatic recount trigger was barely avoided, despite 
protests, as Republican candidate Brian Kemp defeated Democratic 
candidate Stacey Abrams by a final margin of 1.39%.213 Given that 
this was the closest governor’s race in Georgia since 1966, the 
reduction in the automatic trigger threshold is somewhat 
confounding; however, proponents of the new BMDs voting system 
believe the newfound audit capabilities permitted this figure to be 
lowered.214 Critics of the Act, such as Richard DeMillo, a 
Distinguished Professor of Computing at Georgia Institute of 
Technology, maintain the cyber security vulnerabilities attributed to 
BMDs do not produce a trustworthy audit trail and render the 
automatic recount trigger irrelevant because the BMDs may not 
accurately capture voter intent.215 
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Section 42 
Section 42 amends Code section 21-2-498 and introduces the 
criteria and procedural mechanisms for conducting precertification 
tabulation audits for any federal or state general election.216 
Subsection (b) calls for precertification audits to begin as soon as 
possible but no later than the November 2020 general election.217 
Local election superintendents are charged with conducting 
precertification tabulation audits for federal or state general elections, 
and the Act requires such audits be conducted via manual inspection 
of random samples of the official paper ballots.218 Subsection (c) 
enumerates many functions of local election superintendents, 
including the requirements that such officials complete the audit prior 
to final certification of the contest, ensure all types of ballots—in 
person, absentee, and provisional—are included in the audit, provide 
a report of the unofficial final tabulated vote results for the contest to 
the public prior to conducting the audit, and provide details of the 
audit to the public within forty-eight hours of completion.219 
Subsection (d) authorizes the SEB to promulgate rules, 
regulations, and procedures to implement and administer the 
procedural mechanisms for conducting post-election audits, including 
the maintenance and implementation of security procedures to ensure 
voter accuracy throughout the audit process.220 
Subsection (e) provides that the Secretary of State shall conduct a 
risk-limiting audit pilot program to test the accuracy and feasibility of 
these risk-limiting audits.221 If these risk-limiting audits test 
successfully within five business days following the sample election 
results, then all audits across the state are to be conducted in such a 
manner no later than November 1, 2024.222 
                                                                                                                 
Inst. of Tech. (Aug. 23, 2019) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review) [hereinafter 
DeMillo Interview]. 
 216. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 42, at 36–37. 
 217. O.C.G.A. §  21-2-498(b) (2019). 
 218. Id. § 21-2-498(c). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. § 21-2-498(d). 
 221. Id. § 21-2-498(e). 
 222. Id. 
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Section 43 
Section 43 amends subsection (b) of Code section 21-2-499 to give 
the Secretary of State an additional three days to tabulate, compute, 
and canvass the votes cast for presidential electors and lay them 
before the Governor and also gives an additional three days to the 
Governor to certify the slates of presidential electors.223 As such, the 
Secretary of State now must certify by the seventeenth day following 
the presidential election, and the Governor must certify by the 
eighteenth day following the election.224 By extending these 
deadlines, the Act allows more time for the audit process and permits 
a more thorough and exhaustive review procedure that favors 
accuracy over prompt declarations for presidential election outcomes. 
Moreover, this section still allows a superior court judge to alter these 
times for “just cause.”225 Although instances of just cause are not 
specifically enumerated, this provision grants more flexibility to the 
timeframe that accompanies declaring the winner of a presidential 
election and could foreseeably extend the stated deadlines in the 
event presidential candidates are separated by only a few thousand 
votes. 
Section 44 
Section 44 amends paragraph (8) of Code section 21-2-566 to 
include “electronic ballot marker” in the list of items that, if willfully 
tampered with, will constitute interference with primaries and 
elections.226 
Section 45 
Section 45 amends paragraph (3) of Code section 21-2-579 and 
adds electronic ballot markers to the list of voting equipment and 
                                                                                                                 
 223. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 43, at 37. 
 224. § 21-2-499(b). 
 225. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 43, at 37. 
 226. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 44, at 37. 
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provides that it will constitute fraud if an individual assists or enables 
an unauthorized person to use such equipment.227 
Section 46 
Section 46 amends Code section 21-2-580 to include as a felonious 
offense any instance where a person unlawfully tampers with or 
damages an electronic ballot marker or tabulating machine, willfully 
prepares an electronic ballot marker or tabulating machine in an 
improper order for voting, or prevents or attempts to prevent the 
correct operation of such electronic ballot marker, tabulating 
machine, or voting machine.228 
Section 47 
Section 47 amends Code section 21-2-582 to include as a felonious 
offense instances where a person tampers with or damages an 
electronic ballot marker or tabulating machine to be used or being 
used in connection with any primary or general election, in addition 
to instances where a person prevents or attempts to prevent the 
correction of an electronic ballot marker or tabulating machine.229 
Section 48 
Section 48 amends Code section 21-2-582.1 relating to penalty for 
voting equipment modification to include electronic ballot markers in 
the definition of “voting equipment.”230 
Section 49 
Section 49 amends Code section 21-2-587 to include instances of 
poll-worker fraud where a poll worker tampers with electronic ballot 
markers or tabulating machines.231 Additionally, this section includes 
                                                                                                                 
 227. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 45, at 38. 
 228. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 46, at 38. 
 229. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 47, at 38. 
 230. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 48, at 38–39. 
 231. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 49, at 39. 
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instances of poll-worker fraud where a poll worker fails to return to 
election officials an electronic ballot marker or tabulating machine 
memory card.232 
Analysis 
Representative Barry Fleming (R-121st) introduced HB 316 in an 
effort to “uniformly update Georgia’s voting 
machines . . . incorporat[ing] an all new paper ballot 
component . . . [to] move us into the twenty-first century.”233 As 
dozens of legislators noted over the course of the bill’s passage, 
however, the Act has left several potential consequences of the bill 
unaddressed, including a purported unfunded mandate, weak and 
widely misunderstood audit language, and vague language that would 
authorize the Secretary of State to join and provide voters’ personal 
information to nongovernmental organizations.234 Further, whether 
the Act and the voting machines ultimately chosen by the Secretary 
of State adequately secure Georgia voters’ constitutional rights to due 
process and equal protection has yet to be determined by the federal 
court where constitutional challenges to the use of DRE systems are 
still pending.235 
Funding for the Act 
Opponents of the bill were quick to point out that HB 316, for 
which $150 million had already been appropriated in Governor Brian 
Kemp’s (R) proposed Fiscal Year 2020 budget, was unaccompanied 
by a fiscal note and therefore, they believed, in violation of state law, 
                                                                                                                 
 232. Id. 
 233. House Subcommittee Video, supra note 29, at 21 min., 19 sec. (remarks by Rep. Barry Fleming 
(R-121st)). 
 234. See generally Video Recording of Senate Floor Debate (Mar. 13, 2019) (remarks by Sen. Zahra 
Karinshak (D-48th), Sen. Elena Parent (D-42nd), Sen. David Lucas (D-26th), Sen. Steve Henson (D-
41st), Sen. Nan Orrock (D-36th), Sen. Harold Jones II (D-22nd), Sen. Jennifer Jordan (D-6th), and Sen. 
Sally Harrell (D-40th)) https://livestream.com/accounts/26021522/events/7940809/videos/188633474 
[hereinafter Senate Floor Debate]; House Proceedings Video, supra note 39 (remarks by Rep. Jasmine 
Clark (D-108th) and Rep. James Beverly (D-143rd)). 
 235. See generally Curling v. Raffensperger, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT, 2019 WL 3822123 (N.D. Ga. 
Aug. 15, 2019). 
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the Georgia Constitution, and the rules of the Georgia State Senate.236 
During floor debates in the Senate, Senator Elena Parent (D-42nd) 
and Minority Leader Steve Henson (D-41st) vehemently decried 
passage of HB 316 without an accompanying fiscal note, with 
Senator Henson cautioning that it sets a bad precedent for the State of 
Georgia and noting “[i]t is not an accident. There is a reason why we 
do not have a fiscal note.”237 
Other legislators, including Senator Sally Harrell (D-40th) and 
Senator Zahra Karinshak (D-48th), joined in challenging the costs 
that HB 316 would impose on Georgia’s taxpayers and counties, 
citing several conflicting sources that estimated $6 million per year in 
maintenance costs and licensing fees.238 Senator Karinshak, 
remarking that “local governments are probably in for a rude 
awakening,” was particularly troubled that the cost of risk-limiting 
audits was not included in the budget and, based on estimates from 
other states, would be significant.239 Additionally, both Senator 
Parent and Senator David Lucas (D-26th) reported having received 
calls from concerned local election officials about not having the 
necessary funding to maintain the new machines.240 
Lieutenant Governor Geoff Duncan (R) overruled Senator 
Henson’s objection that HB 316 was out of order, finding instead that 
HB 316’s fiscal impact had already been sufficiently addressed by 
the Fiscal Year 2020 budget that calls for $150 million in bond funds 
to pay for the new voting machines.241 In response, Senator Henson 
                                                                                                                 
 236. Senate Proceedings Video, supra note 47, at 1 hr., 53 min., 51 sec. (remarks by Sen. Steve 
Henson (D-41st)). O.C.G.A. § 28-5-42 requires that “[a]ny bill having a significant impact on the 
anticipated revenue or expenditure level of any . . . state agency must be introduced no later than the 
twentieth day of any session,” and that the sponsor must request a fiscal note on such bills “by 
November 1 of the year preceding the annual convening of the General Assembly in which the bill is to 
be introduced . . . .” O.C.G.A. § 28-5-42 (2018); see also DeMillo Interview, supra note 213 (the lack of 
a fiscal note “calls into question the legitimacy of the entire legislative process and raises constitutional 
issues that undermine public confidence in elections”). 
 237. Senate Proceedings Video, supra note 47, at 1 hr., 53 min., 51 sec. (remarks by Sen. Steve 
Henson (D-41st)). 
 238. Senate Floor Debate, supra note 234, at 2 hr., 42 min., 48 sec. (Mar. 13, 2019) (remarks by Sen. 
Zahra Karinshak (D-48th)). Senator Karinshak noted that the original report that Election Systems & 
Software submitted had informed the Secretary of State that the additional costs would come to 
approximately $6 million annually and that legislators “have no idea who’s paying for this.” Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 2 hr., 8 min., 1 sec. (remarks by Sen. Elena Parent (D-42nd) and Sen. David Lucas 
(D-26th)). 
 241. HB 316, as introduced, 2019 Ga. Gen. Assemb.; Danny Kanso, Overview of Georgia’s 2020 
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moved to challenge Lieutenant Governor Duncan’s ruling, and 
pursuant to Code section 28-5-49(c)(2), the Senate voted along party 
lines to waive the requirement of a local impact fiscal note. 
Auditing Required by the Act 
Another unresolved consequence of HB 316 involves audit 
procedures and requirements under the new law. Originally touted as 
one of the bill’s crucial features,242 several legislators and experts 
have since criticized it for its weak language.243 After noting that 
auditability is an “all-important” feature of HB 316 in his 
presentation to the Senate Committee on Ethics, Representative 
Fleming also stated that exact audit procedures will “have to be 
fleshed out once [the State] know[s] what kind of systems [it is] 
going to have.”244 
In fact, HB 316 only requires a precertification tabulation audit to 
be conducted, which, after an amendment by Senate Democrats was 
proposed to and accepted by the Senate Ethics Committee, must take 
place no later than November 2020.245 Risk-limiting audits, however, 
are not required as a permanent feature; instead, the Secretary of 
State must conduct a risk-limiting audit pilot program with a risk 
limit of no more than 10% in a minimum of one county by December 
31, 2021.246 Within ninety days, the Secretary of State must report to 
the General Assembly with a plan on how risk-limited audits would 
be implemented statewide.247 
                                                                                                                 
Fiscal Year Budget, GA. BUDGET & POL’Y INST. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://gbpi.org/2019/overview-of-
georgia-2020-fiscal-year-budget/ [https://perma.cc/9SGJ-XAWB]. 
 242. Video Recording of Senate Ethics Committee Meeting at 37 min., 32 sec. (Mar. 6, 2019) 
(remarks by Rep. Barry Fleming (R-121st)), 
https://livestream.com/accounts/26021522/events/8751687/videos/194387379 [hereinafter Senate Ethics 
Committee Video]. 
 243. Senate Floor Debate, supra note 234 at 2 hr., 53 min., 50 sec. (remarks by Sen. Elena Parent 
(D-42nd)); Senate Ethics Committee Video, supra note 242, 37 min., 32 sec. (remarks by Rep. Barry 
Fleming (R-121st). 
 244. Senate Ethics Committee Video, supra note 242, 37 min., 32 sec. (remarks by Rep. Barry 
Fleming (R-121st). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See generally Post-Election Audits, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGS. (Aug. 5, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/VMJ7-XEBE]. 
 247. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-498(e) (2019). 
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Senator Elena Parent sharply criticized her colleagues in the 
Senate for not recognizing the difference between risk-limiting audits 
and precertification tabulation audits, stating that: 
 
[T]he audit language itself in this bill is extremely 
weak. It doesn’t require any risk-limiting audit except 
for the pilot program, which is only in one county. It 
doesn’t require them after that. So with all this talk 
about audits . . . the bill doesn’t even say we’re going 
to require them.248 
 
Garland Favorito, founder of VOTER GA and information 
technology expert, confirmed this sentiment in his testimony to the 
Senate Ethics Committee. Favorito explained: 
 
Experts say that the audits of [BMDs] are 
meaningless . . . . The bill works off of risk-limiting 
audit procedures, but in the bill, if you read it very 
carefully, the procedures are all conditional, not 
mandatory . . . Essentially what it says is we might 
have some audit procedures in 2024 or later, so that 
puts emphasis on having a very, very secure machine. 
We can’t rely on auditing.249 
 
Favorito further cautioned that he believed HB 316 legalized 
unverifiable voting because not only is the onus for catching machine 
errors and alterations on the voter, but also “BMDs do not provide 
voters a way to demonstrate to poll workers or elections officials that 
a BMD has malfunctioned.”250 
Beth K. Boatright & Andrew Smith 
                                                                                                                 
 248. Senate Floor Debate, supra note 234, at 2 hr., 53 min., 50 sec. (remarks by Sen. Elena Parent (D-
42nd)). 
 249. Senate Ethics Committee Video, supra note 242, at 37 min., 32 sec. (remarks by Garland 
Favorito, VOTER GA). 
 250. Id. Favorito noted that this conclusion is supported by twenty-four computer scientists who 
wrote to the SAFE Commission in 2018 to caution against the use of BMDs because voters become 
entirely responsible for catching any discrepancies between the voter’s intent and the printed summary 
of their ballot. Id. 
42
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss1/6
